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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In addition to an upset winner and nationwide sensation in Funny Cide,2 the 2003 
Kentucky Derby produced a great deal of controversy.  While the cheating 
allegations against, and subsequent exoneration of, winning jockey Jose Santos are 
well known,3 less so is another issue which may have significant impact both on the 
future of horse racing and the First Amendment.  During the running of the Derby, 
Santos and thirteen of his fellow riders wore patches on their pants promoting the 
Jockeys’ Guild.4  The patches, which measured 3 by 5 inches, were determined by 
the Churchill Downs’ stewards to violate a regulation which prohibits jockeys from 
wearing advertising during a race.5  The stewards, therefore, fined each rider who 
wore the patch $500.6  Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Kentucky Racing 
Commission (the “Commission”),7 the jockeys have filed suit in Kentucky state court 
seeking to have the fines overturned.8   
Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Commission raises a number of significant First 
Amendment issues.  After providing the background of the case and discussing 
issues related to jockey advertising, this article will analyze the Desormeaux 
plaintiffs’ claims under a variety of First Amendment doctrines, including:  political 
speech, commercial speech, public employer, and public forum.  The article 
concludes that the jockeys present a strong First Amendment challenge to the 
regulation as applied in Desormeaux, but that on the larger issue of jockey 
advertising the Commission has valid arguments in support of the prohibition.     
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Controversy Over Jockey Advertising  
Professional athletes “have been endorsing products as long as there has been a 
medium to record or broadcast [their] exploits.”9  In recent years, these endorsement 
                                                                
2At odds of 12-1, Funny Cide became the first gelding to win the Derby since 1929 and 
the first New York-bred winner ever.  Andrew Beyer, Funny Cide Up, WASH. POST, May 4, 
2003, at E1. 
3Shortly after the race, media across the country reported on a picture appearing to show 
Santos with a black object — possibly an illegal electrical device with which to shock Funny 
Cide — in his hand while aboard the horse.  Andrew Beyer, Derby Stewards on Wrong Track, 
WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at D1.  Ultimately, the “object” was determined to be an optical 
illusion.  Id.  The Churchill Downs’ stewards thus cleared Santos of wrongdoing.  Id.      
4Marty McGee, Riders file suit over logos worn in Kentucky Derby, DAILY RACING FORM, 
Nov. 9, 2003, at 3.  The Jockeys’ Guild is the labor union for jockeys.  Id.   
5Id. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8See Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Comm’n, Petition for Review of Final Order of 
Kentucky Racing Commission, No. 03CI09792 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky., Nov. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Petition].  On November, 17, 2003, the case was transferred to Franklin Circuit 
Court.  See Nov. 17, 2003 Order (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Div. 3).  
9Sean Wood, Athlete Endorsements Sell, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Aug. 26, 2002, at B11. 
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deals have become increasingly lucrative, culminating in Nike’s $90 million, seven 
year contract with LeBron James, the number one pick in the 2003 National 
Basketball Association draft.10  In horse racing, it is not individual athletes but rather 
premier events, such as the Derby and the Breeders’ Cup, that “are saturated with 
core sponsors.”11  Most prominent is Visa’s sponsorship of the Triple Crown — i.e., 
the Derby, the Preakness, and the Belmont Stakes — with its $5 million bonus to the 
winner of all three races.12   
Jockeys do not receive a direct financial benefit from corporate sponsorships of 
races.13  But like other independent contractor athletes, such as golfers or tennis 
players,14 many jockeys15 are interested in making “extra income from endorsement 
deals.”16  This desire, in turn, has given rise to the notion of jockeys entering 
contracts to wear advertising or promotional messages during races.17  
Traditionalists, however, oppose such promotion or advertising, in particular because 
they do not “want jockeys to look like NASCAR drivers.”18  Thus, the wearing of 
advertising or other promotional items by jockeys “has been a hot-button issue for 
years in a number of racing jurisdictions throughout North America.”19 
                                                                
10Id.; Jeff Caplan, Megadeals That Were, and Weren’t, FT. WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Jan. 
4, 2004, at 2C. 
11Marcus Green, Suit Could Open Door to Ad Laden Jockeys, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, 
Nov. 12, 2003, at F1. 
12Andrew Beyer, Tight Schedule Puts Squeeze on Preakness Field, WASH. POST, May 14, 
2003, at D1. 
13Green, supra note 11. 
14In 2002, tennis player Venus Williams “signed a reported five-year, $40 million US deal 
with Reebok, which would be the richest endorsement contract for a female athlete.”  Wood, 
supra note 9.  Likewise, golfer Tiger Woods’ endorsement deals reportedly earn him $100 
million annually.  Masuoka Brandon, Golfers Weigh in on Wie’s Future, THE HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Mar. 29, 2004, at 2C.  
15Larry Stumes, California Jockeys Giving Wearable Ads a Leg Up, S. F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 
23, 2002, at C6 (noting that “[n]early all of [California’s] riders have signed with Jockeys 
Management Group,” an organization founded to pursue marketing deals for jockeys). 
16Green, supra note 11.  While the value of jockey endorsement deals would not be 
expected to even approach the levels of athletes in other sports, any additional income would 
be beneficial because, among other reasons, jockeys are “responsible for their own expenses, 
including insurance premiums, which are astronomical because of the risk inherent in the 
profession.”  Billy Reed, Patch or No Patch, Jockeys are Just Climbing Aboard the Train of 
Corporate Sponsorship, SNITCH, Nov. 26, 2003, at 7.  While some top jockeys, such as Jerry 
Bailey, may make over $2 million a year, others “barely make a living.”  Id.  The lower a 
jockey is on the economic scale, obviously “the more burdensome the insurance premiums 
become.”  Id.   
17Green, supra note 11. 
18Reed, supra note 16.  According to Albert Fiss, vice-president of the Jockeys’ Guild, the 
Desormeaux lawsuit will come down to whether the courts look at racing tradition “as more 
important than the First Amendment.”  Green, supra note 11 (quotations omitted).   
19McGee, supra note 4; see Dave Joseph, “Shock Mode”:  This Space Available; A 
Tradition-Bound Sport Resists Corporate Ads on Jockey Apparel, SUN-SENTINEL, July 9, 
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Regulations on jockey attire vary from state to state, but generally “racetracks 
and government regulators have been able to control advertising rights despite the 
collective protestations of jockeys.”20  Not entirely, however.  While Kentucky bans 
jockey advertising,21 California and New York permit it, subject to certain 
limitations.22  Thus, in the 2003 Belmont Stakes, held in New York, “some jockeys 
wore patches advertising Wrangler and Budweiser,” reportedly angering Visa, the 
sponsor of the Triple Crown.23  Later in 2003, during the Breeder’s Cup at Santa 
Anita Park, the California racing board suspended that state’s rule permitting 
advertising by jockeys.24  The California board’s suspension of jockey advertising 
was viewed as an effort to “protect some or all of the sponsors or marketing partners 
that participate in the Breeder’s Cup . . . .”25   
                                                          
2003, at 1C.  Unlike in North America, advertising on “jockeys’ clothing [is] common in 
European racing . . . .”  Kevin Modesti, Skimming Way to Classic, THE DAILY NEWS OF LOS 
ANGELES, July 27, 2001, at S8.    
20McGee, supra note 4; see Green, supra note 11 (quoting R.J. Kors, founder of Jockeys 
Management Group, which has marketing agreements with more than 150 riders:  “How can 
you look at a professional jockey as any different from any other professional athlete that’s an 
independent contractor? . . . How can an industry suppress an economic opportunity for a 
jockey’s career?”) (quotations omitted); see Joseph, supra note 19 (quoting Jerry Bailey:  
“We’re the lowest paid athletes on the field . . . I don’t think you can deny us the opportunity 
to make money through advertisements if it’s done under certain guidelines.”) (quotations 
omitted). 
21See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009, § 14 (2002).  Minnesota likewise prohibits such 
advertising.  See MINN. R. 7877.0170(3)(L) (2003). 
22See 4 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 1691(b) (2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. title 9, 
§ 4041.6 (2004).  Other state regulations are silent on the issue, see, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE 
title 205, § 4.15 (2004); ILL. ADMIN. CODE title 11, § 1411.05 (2004); TEX. ADMIN. CODE title 
16, § 313.406 (2004); MD. REGS. CODE title 09, § 10.01.21 (2004); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3769-6-26 (2003); W. VA. CODE S.R. § 178-1-45 (2004), although some require that jockeys 
wear “traditional” or “conventional” attire, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. title 13, § 402-001-8.13 
(2004); ARK CODE ANN. title 6, § 06-003-2162 (2004); 58 PA. CODE § 163.175 (2004); LA. 
ADMIN. CODE title 46, § 741 (2002), which presumably would exclude advertising.   
23Reed, supra note 16.  The jockeys in question, Jerry Bailey and Jose Santos, reportedly 
received “five-figure deals” to wear the logos.  Joseph, supra note 19.  Bailey put on a 
“Wrangler hat in the winner’s circle after riding Empire Maker to victory in the Belmont.”  
Id.; see also Sigrid Kun, Race Horses and Intellectual Property Rights:  Racing Towards 
Recognition?, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 207, 225 n.167 (1997) (describing one jockey at 
Remington Park being sponsored by Pepsi and wearing its logo during workouts and races); 
Notes, Skip Away Captures Massachusetts Handicap, THE SPORTS NETWORK, June 1, 1997 
(jockeys in the race allowed to wear advertisements on their silks after officials determined 
there was nothing in Massachusetts regulations barring riders from wearing promotional 
materials).  In addition, jockeys, including certain of the plaintiffs in Desormeaux, have 
allegedly worn the Jockey Guild patch in races at tracks in California, Illinois, Maryland, and 
Texas.  Petition, ¶ 42. 
24Green, supra note 11. 
25Id. (quotations omitted).  Corporate sponsors of races “may feel undercut” by jockey 
advertising, particularly promotions by competing brands, a phenomenon known as “ambush 
marketing.”  Id. (quotations omitted).  See supra note 23 and accompanying text.   
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/4
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Following the Belmont and Breeder’s Cup controversies, Desormeaux is the 
“third salvo” in the “growing battle” over jockey advertising.26  Both sides agree that 
the First Amendment issues presented may ultimately require resolution by the 
United States Supreme Court.27 
B.  Desormeaux Proceedings Before the Commission  
The Kentucky Legislature has “vest[ed] in the [C]ommission forceful control of 
horse racing in the Commonwealth,” giving it “plenary power to promulgate 
administrative regulations prescribing conditions under which all legitimate horse 
racing and wagering thereon is conducted . . . .”28  The Commission’s purpose is to 
ensure horse racing in Kentucky is of the “highest quality and free of any corrupt, 
incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled” practices, and to “maintain the appearance 
as well as the fact of complete honesty and integrity of horse racing in the 
Commonwealth.”29  Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has enacted 
comprehensive rules governing horse racing, including, inter alia, jockey attire.30  
Specifically, the Commission prohibits jockeys during a race from wearing any 
“advertising, promotional, or cartoon symbols or wording” which is “not in keeping 
with the traditions of the turf.”31 
On the appeal of their fines, the Commission determined that the Desormeaux 
jockeys’ purpose in wearing the Guild patch during the Derby was “to promote their 
organization and gain more members.”32  The Commission, however, deemed this 
purpose to be commercial, rather than political, finding that the patch “is an 
advertising and promotional symbol.”33  Further, because the traditional attire of a 
“jockey does not include advertising or promotional symbols,” the Commission 
concluded that wearing the patch violated the regulation.34  In addition, the 
Commission reasoned that wearing the patch “could be a distraction to the eye and 
                                                                
26Green, supra note 11. 
27Id. (quoting J. Bruce Miller, attorney for the Commission:  “It probably is a Supreme 
Court case if it keeps going.”); see Tom Wolski, Jockeys Protest, THE VANCOUVER PROVINCE, 
Nov. 16, 2003, at A68 (quoting Darrell Haire, representative for the Jockeys’ Guild:  “We will 
take this as far as it has to go, even if that means the Supreme Court.”). 
28KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (2002). 
29Id.  On January 6, 2004, Governor Ernie Fletcher announced that he was abolishing the 
Commission and replacing it with a new entity called the Kentucky Horse Racing Authority.  
Editorial, A Clean Break, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 8, 2004, at A6; Tom Loftus, State’s 
Top Racing Official Resigns, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 15, 2004, at B1.  In addition to 
regulating racing, the new body will be charged with promoting the sport.  Id.  For 
consistency, this article will refer to the defendant in Desormeaux as “the Commission.”    
30See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009. 
31Id. at § 14; see Petition, ¶ 22. 
32Commission’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter Conclusion of 
Law], attached as Exhibit A to the Petition, Finding of Fact No. 8 [hereiafter Finding of Fact]. 
33Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 9. 
34Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 8. 
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effect the concentration of the stewards in the performance of their duties.”35  
Whether the Commission found the patch in fact to be a distraction is unclear, 
particularly given its later statement that “allow[ing] the patch in this case could lead 
down the slippery slope where the jockeys would resemble NASCAR drivers and 
therefore hinder the stewards in the performance of their duties.”36 
In contrast to the Commission’s characterization, the Desormeaux plaintiffs 
explicitly disavow any commercial intent in wearing the patch, and instead allege 
that the emblem merely “identified the jockeys as members of their labor union 
. . . .”
37
  Further, the jockeys allege that the purpose of “wearing the patch was to 
promote their labor union, to increase membership in the union and to bring to the 
attention of the public the unconscionable plight of disabled jockeys.”38  Thus, the 
jockeys assert, inter alia, that being fined for wearing the patch violated their First 
Amendment rights.39 
C.  Overbreadth Challenge 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Desormeaux plaintiffs have 
challenged the regulation on overbreadth grounds.40  The overbreadth doctrine is a 
“departure from traditional rules of standing,”41 allowing an individual to “challenge 
a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court — those 
who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing 
so rather than risk prosecution . . . .’”42  A law should be invalidated for overbreadth 
                                                                
35Finding of Fact, supra note 32, at No. 12 (emphasis added). 
36Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 12 (emphasis added). 
37Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 47. 
38Id. at ¶ 32.  In some states, including Kentucky, tracks will pay a disabled jockey up to 
$100,000.  Reed, supra note 16.  As noted, however, jockeys are responsible for their own 
insurance premiums, which can be prohibitively expensive.  Id.  Thus, even with a payment 
from the track, a catastrophic injury can leave a jockey with no way to pay his medical 
expenses.  Id.  And the dangerousness of a jockey’s life cannot be overstated:  the Jockeys’ 
Guild receives “an average of twenty-five hundred injury notifications per year, with two 
deaths and two and a half cases of paralysis.”  LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT:  AN 
AMERICAN LEGEND, 73 (Ballantine Books, 2001).  As of 2001, the Guild was “supporting fifty 
riders who were permanently disabled on the job.”  Id.  
39Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 16; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . 
. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).  The provisions of the First 
Amendment are incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Schneider v. 
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). 
40Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 51. 
41Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).  Generally, “courts will not assess the 
constitutionality of a provision apart from its particular application.”  Newsom v. Albemarle 
County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2003).  Cases involving freedom of speech, 
however, “are frequently excepted from this general rule.”  Id.   
42Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (citation 
omitted).  The Desormeaux plaintiffs who are before the court challenging the fines for 
wearing the Guild patch are, of course, equally affected by the advertising ban.      
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/4
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only if “it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications,”43 and no 
“‘limiting construction’ or ‘partial invalidation’ could ‘remove the seeming threat or 
deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.’”44  If a law is overbroad, “any 
enforcement” of it is “totally forbidden.”45  Conversely, if a law is found 
unconstitutional “as applied,” it may not be applied to the challenger, but otherwise 
remains in effect.46  
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, certain classes 
of speech have more value than others; that is, different standards govern restrictions 
on different types of speech.47  Thus, the proper characterization of the Desormeaux 
jockeys’ wearing the Guild patch — i.e., whether this amounts to commercial speech 
or so-called “pure speech” — is of critical importance in determining the validity of 
the regulation as applied by the Commission.48  Because a state “cannot foreclose the 
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,”49 the Commission’s terming the 
patch an “advertising or promotional symbol,” that consequently is subject to 
regulation, will likely not be dispositive.50  Rather, as will be discussed, there is a 
compelling argument that wearing the patch constitutes “pure speech,” which is 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.51  On the broader question, however, of 
whether true commercial speech can be prohibited in these circumstances, the 
Commission has good arguments in support of the regulation.52 
III.  CORE FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH:  STRICT SCRUTINY 
A.  Overview of Political Speech Doctrine 
While the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee is recognized as a 
fundamental right,53 it is equally well recognized that this right is not “absolute at all 
                                                                
43New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).  An overbreadth plaintiff must show 
“that a regulation’s overbreadth is ‘not only . . . real, but substantial as well, judged in relation 
to the [challenged regulation’s] plainly legitimate sweep . . . .’”  Newsom, 354 F.3d at 258 
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).  
44Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615).  This is not to say, however, that a court 
will rewrite a law “to conform it to constitutional requirements.”  Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).   
45Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
46City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1988). 
47See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (noting that 
lower court “applied a significantly more lenient standard than is appropriate in a case of this 
kind”). 
48See infra Section III. 
49NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
50See Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 9. 
51See infra Section III. 
52See infra Sections IV-VI. 
53Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).  In the words of the Supreme 
Court, the First Amendment secures “the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms.”  
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times and under all circumstances.”54  Thus, there are “certain well-defined” classes 
of speech which may be prohibited consistent with the First Amendment.55  On this 
low end of the constitutional spectrum are things like “fighting words,” which have 
no protection under the First Amendment.56   
Conversely, discussion of public issues — so-called “political speech” — is 
afforded the broadest protection by the First Amendment.57  In Pickering v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court characterized the “public interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” as the First Amendment’s “core 
value.”58  Restrictions on such speech are subject to the most stringent form of 
review, strict scrutiny.59    
Of relevance to Desormeaux, communications which attempt to persuade or 
dissuade the joining of labor unions are considered core speech protected by the First 
Amendment.60  To illustrate, in Thomas v. Collins the defendant was cited for 
                                                          
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).  As is oft noted, the First Amendment’s purpose 
is “to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail 
. . . .”  Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 507 U.S. 1301, 1304 
(1993) (quotations omitted).  Consequently, the First Amendment generally bars the 
government “from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002). 
54Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.  For example, in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919) (citation omitted), the Supreme Court recognized that “the character of every act 
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”  While 
admitting that “in many places and in ordinary times” the defendants would have been within 
their constitutional rights to distribute a circular objecting to the military draft, in the context 
of World War I the Court held that such activity was not protected by the First Amendment:  
“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured . . . .”  Id.     
55Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. 
56Id.  In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for violating a 
statute that prohibited a person from addressing another with “offensive” words in public, 
reasoning that such “fighting words” were not entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 569, 571-72.   
57Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
58391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).  In Pickering, a public school teacher was fired after sending a 
letter critical of the school board to his local newspaper.  Id. at 564.  The Supreme Court ruled 
the firing violated the First Amendment, holding that “absent proof of false statements 
knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of 
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”  Id. at 
574 (footnote omitted).   
59McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 
‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest.”) (citations omitted).  In addition, strict scrutiny requires there be no 
less restrictive alternative available.  United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
60National Labor Relations Bd. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477, 479 
(1941).   
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contempt for violating a restraining order prohibiting him from soliciting members 
for certain unions without first obtaining an organizer’s card.61  In reversing the 
conviction, the Supreme Court noted that the right “to discuss, and inform people 
concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is 
protected” free speech.62  Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant’s First 
Amendment rights had been violated.63 
Similarly, in Thornhill v. Alabama the Supreme Court recognized that “the 
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be 
regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”64  The Court further termed “[f]ree discussion concerning the 
conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes” to be “indispensable.”65  
Accordingly, the Court found unconstitutional a law which prohibited publicizing the 
facts of a labor dispute in the vicinity of the dispute, and reversed the defendant’s 
conviction for picketing outside a business involved in a strike.66   
B.  Expressive Conduct Equally Protected 
While the First Amendment explicitly refers to “speech,” it is well established 
that expressive conduct is also protected.67  Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long 
recognized” that the First Amendment’s “protection does not end at the spoken or 
written word.”68  For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District a group of high school students wore black arm bands to school in 
protest of Vietnam.69  They were then suspended from school.70  In reversing the 
                                                                
61323 U.S. 516, 518 (1945).  The defendant was the president of the International U.A.W. 
and resided in Detroit.  Id. at 520.  He came to Texas to give a speech to local union members 
and supporters.  Id.  Prior to his speech, a state court issued an order enjoining the defendant 
from soliciting members for any union without first obtaining an organizer’s card, as required 
by statute; the defendant violated this order.  Id. at 521. 
62Id. at 532. 
63Id. at 532, 543. 
64310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). 
65Id. at 102, 103; see also Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) 
(“Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known 
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”). 
66Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91-92, 101. 
67Perhaps the most famous constitutional recognition of expressive conduct is Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989), where the Supreme Court struck down a state statute 
which prohibited flag burning.  See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) 
(reversing conviction for improper exhibition of United States flag where defendant displayed 
flag upside down with peace symbol attached).  But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 382 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to conviction for burning draft card; 
Court “cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”).  
68Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. 
69393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
70Id.  
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dismissal of the students’ subsequent suit against the school officials, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that wearing the armbands “was closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, 
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First 
Amendment.”71   
Recently, in Newsom v. Albemarle County School Board, the federal Fourth 
Circuit, reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction, held there was a strong 
likelihood of success on a First Amendment claim against a school dress code which 
prohibited messages on clothing related to weapons.72  Applying the Tinker 
standard,73 the court concluded the dress code could “be understood as reaching 
lawful, nonviolent, and nonthreatening symbols of not only popular, but important 
organizations and ideals.”74  Because the code excluded a “broad range and scope of 
symbols, images, and political messages that are entirely legitimate and even 
laudatory,” the court held the injunction should have been granted.75 
C.  Political Speech Analysis of Desormeaux  
In Desormeaux, the plaintiffs allege that they wore the Guild patch to promote 
their union, increase its membership, and bring attention to the issue of disabled 
jockeys.76  This should be considered protected speech under Thomas and Thornhill, 
in that the jockeys allegedly were promoting their union and raising awareness of the 
dangerousness of their working conditions.77  Further, under the reasoning of Tinker 
and Newsom, wearing the patch can be considered a form of expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.78  
                                                                
71Id. at 505-06.  The Court acknowledged the need for school officials, “consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”  Id. at 
507.  But, given there was no evidence of conduct which would “‘interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’” the Court concluded 
the prohibition on armbands violated the First Amendment.  Id. 
72354 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 2003).  In Newsom, a student sought a preliminary injunction 
against the school dress code after being disciplined for wearing a tee-shirt which “depicted 
three black silhouettes of men holding firearms superimposed on the letters ‘NRA’ positioned 
above the phrase ‘SHOOTING SPORTS CAMP.’”  Id. at 252. 
73The court recognized there was no evidence that clothing with messages related to 
weapons “disrupted school operations or interfered with the rights of others.”  Id. at 259. 
74Newsom, 354 F.3d at 259-60.  As an example, the court noted the code would prohibit 
clothing depicting the state seal of Virginia, which shows a woman holding a spear.  Id. at 
260.  Likewise, the court reasoned that the “quintessential political message” the school was 
trying to promote—“‘Guns and School Don’t Mix’”—would be prohibited by the code.  Id. at 
260. 
75Id. 
76Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 32. 
77See Thomas, 323 U.S at 532; Thornhill, 310 U.S at 102, 103. 
78See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06; Newsom, 354 F.3d at 260.  The Commission, of course, 
could argue that the patch is “disruptive” based on its finding that the stewards could be 
distracted by it.  See Finding of Fact No. 12; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.  Given, however, that 
this finding was posited as a “slippery slope” consideration, see Conclusion of Law No. 12, 
such an argument is not particularly persuasive, especially when balanced against the high 
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Indeed, in a similar case, In re Reynolds, the California Supreme Court held that 
an inmate’s First Amendment rights were violated when he was denied permission to 
wear a prisoner’s union button while incarcerated.79  Under this rationale, the 
Desormeaux plaintiffs appear to have a valid “as applied” First Amendment 
challenge to the regulation at issue.  Whether that regulation should be struck down 
on overbreadth grounds, however, is another issue, initially requiring analysis of the 
commercial speech doctrine.  
IV.  COMMERCIAL SPEECH:  INTERMEDIATE STANDARD 
A.  Distinction Between Content-Based v. Neutral Restrictions Inapplicable 
Traditionally, the First Amendment has given life to the “principle that each 
person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 
consideration, and adherence.”80  A regulation that “stifles speech on account of its 
message” — i.e., its content — “contravenes this essential right.”81  Such restrictions 
“pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate 
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the 
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”82  In other words, through 
content-based restrictions the “‘Government may effectively drive certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the marketplace.’”83  To prevent an outcome so obviously contrary 
to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has “consistently applied strict scrutiny 
to content-based regulations of speech.”84 
Determining whether a particular regulation is content-based is “not always a 
simple task.”85 The general rule, however, is that “laws that by their terms 
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or views 
expressed are content-based.”86  Singling out commercial speech for prohibition 
while leaving other forms of speech untouched — which the regulation at issue in 
                                                          
First Amendment value afforded speech promoting unions.  See supra notes 60, 63 and 
accompanying text. 
79599 P.2d 86, 87 (Cal. 1979).  In so holding, the court noted there was no evidence of 
“disruption” in the prison, either past or future, caused by wearing the button.  Id. at 88; cf. 
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (finding ban 
on inmate union meetings and solicitation reasonable where such activities could pose 
“additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of the State’s penal 
institutions”).  
80Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641 
(1994). 
81Id. 
82Id.   
83Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
116 (1991). 
84Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641-43.  
85Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 642. 
86Id. at 643. 
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Desormeaux does — arguably amounts to a content-based restriction, which 
ordinarily would be subject to strict scrutiny.87  Despite being content-based, 
however, restrictions on commercial speech do not receive strict scrutiny.88      
B.  Overview of Commercial Speech Doctrine 
On the contrary, commercial speech has a checkered history under Supreme 
Court precedents.89  In an early case, Valentine v. Chrestensen,  the Supreme Court 
held that the First Amendment provided no “restraint on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising.”90  Reversing course, in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court held that simply 
because an advertiser’s “interest is a purely economic one . . . hardly disqualifies him 
from protection under the First Amendment.”91  Rather, recognizing that society has 
a “strong interest in the free flow of commercial information,”92 the Court struck 
down regulations prohibiting the advertising of prescription drug information.93   
Later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
the Supreme Court settled on an intermediate standard for determining whether 
commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.94  Under this standard, a 
court examines:  (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether 
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether 
the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.95  In Board 
                                                                
87See 810 KRA 1:009, § 14 (banning commercial, but not other types, of speech).  In fact, 
the Desormeaux plaintiffs have alleged that Pat Day, one of the other jockeys in the Derby, 
during the race wore a tunic with the symbol of a Crucifix, but was not fined by the stewards.  
Petition, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 39, 41.  
88Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 
(1980) (applying intermediate standard to commercial speech and noting “[i]n most other 
contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the message”).  
Indeed, even restrictions on advertising for particular products receive only intermediate 
review.  See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (applying intermediate review to restrictions on 
tobacco advertising); id. at 574-75 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
89Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (“There was once a time when this Court declined to give any 
First Amendment protection to commercial speech.”) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
90316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
91425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) 
(Advertising is not “stripped of all First Amendment protection.  The relationship of speech to 
the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of 
ideas.”). 
92Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 764; see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 495 (1996) (“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history,” 
providing “vital information about the market.”). 
93Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 764, 772. 
94447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
95Id. at 566.  Expounding on the interest necessary to sustain a restriction on commercial 
speech, the Court has noted that a state “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and 
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”  Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 
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of Trustees v. Fox, the Supreme Court clarified that the last Central Hudson factor 
requires only a “reasonable fit” between the regulation and the interest, rather than 
the least restrictive means available.96  
The Central Hudson test has been criticized on a number of grounds, including 
its flexibility,97 which leaves “both sides of the debate with their own well of 
precedent from which to draw.”98  Indeed, several members of the Supreme Court 
“have expressed doubt about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should 
apply in particular cases.”99  In addition to its malleability, another significant 
problem with the doctrine involves the difficulty in identifying commercial speech, 
as opposed to more protected forms.100  In fact, the Court has expressly declined to 
define the necessary elements of commercial speech.101  Relatedly, the jurisprudence 
treats all speech as “either commercial or noncommercial,” with the former receiving 
less protection, despite the reality that some messages can carry both commercial 
and noncommercial meanings.102   
For instance, in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky the California Supreme Court held that certain 
statements made by Nike during a labor dispute amounted to commercial speech, 
despite the fact the statements were made in response to “public criticism.”103  
Because the speech was deemed commercial, the court reasoned that any false or 
misleading statements by Nike were not protected by the First Amendment, again 
                                                          
761, 770-71 (1993); see also Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (restrictions on commercial speech require more than “mere 
speculation or conjecture”). 
96
 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).   
97See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (“the Court has followed an uncertain course — much of 
the uncertainty being generated by the malleability of the four-part balancing test of Central 
Hudson”) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
98Floyd Abrams, A Growing Marketplace of Ideas, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at S28;  
Compare, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (holding ban on 
newsracks containing commercial handbills, but not newspapers, unconstitutional) with United 
States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding federal statute prohibiting radio 
and television stations from airing lottery advertisements in states where lotteries are illegal) 
and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc’s v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding 
restrictions on casino advertising in Puerto Rico). 
99Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted).   
100Id. at 575 (“I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech.”) (Thomas, J., concurring); Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 7 (2000) (the “impossibility 
of specifying the parameters that define the category of commercial speech has haunted its 
jurisprudence and scholarship”). 
101See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 n.14 (1983) (“We express 
no opinion as to whether reference to any particular product or service is a necessary element 
of commercial speech”). 
102Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 268 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
103Id. at 247. 
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without regard to whether they were related to a matter of public concern.104 In 
dissent, one justice contended that because “the gap between commercial and 
noncommercial speech is rapidly shrinking,” the Central Hudson doctrine — with its 
lesser value for speech deemed commercial, regardless of the speech’s connection to 
public issues — “fails to account for the realities of the modern world.”105   
The Supreme Court, however, has seen “no need to break new ground.”106  
Rather, in commercial speech cases Central Hudson remains an “adequate basis for 
decision.”107 
C.  Commercial Speech Analysis of Desormeaux 
In affirming the Desormeaux plaintiffs’ fines, the Commission identified two 
interests furthered by the prohibition on jockey advertising:  (1) upholding the 
“traditions of the turf,” and, relatedly, (2) protecting the ability of the stewards to 
perform their duties, i.e., ensuring the integrity and safety of the sport.108  The latter 
interest, in particular, would seem to be “substantial” within the meaning of Central 
Hudson.109  Whether the advertising ban “directly advances” that interest, and 
whether there is a “reasonable fit” between the ban and the interest, are potential 
battlegrounds.110   
Specifically, on the issue of “reasonable fit,” there is a question as to whether all 
advertising or promotional symbols, regardless of size, have the ability to interfere 
with the stewards’ performance.111  The Commission, of course, concluded that even 
the 3 by 5 inch Guild patch, much less larger symbols, “could be a distraction to the 
eye and effect the concentration of the stewards in the performance of their 
duties.”112  The reasonableness of this determination will be significant in 
                                                                
104Id. at 262.  The state may ban all “commercial speech ‘that is fraudulent or deceptive 
without further justification,’ but may not do the same to fraudulent or deceptive speech in 
‘matters of public concern.’”  Id. at 268-69 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
105Id. at 269 (Brown, J., dissenting); see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History 
and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993); Kozinski & Banner, 
Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990). 
106Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (quotations omitted).  The Supreme Court initially granted 
certiorari to review Nike, but then withdrew the writ as “improvidently granted.”  Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).   
107Lorillard, 533 U.S at 555 (quotations omitted). 
108See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
109447 U.S at 564, 568-69; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (Commission’s purpose is 
to maintain “complete honesty and integrity of horse racing in the Commonwealth”); Baffert 
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Preserving the integrity of 
racing is a significant interest, especially in view of the fact that California permits wagering 
on horse racing.”). 
110Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
111Id. 
112See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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determining whether the ban satisfies the Central Hudson standard.113  But in any 
event, given the lesser value placed on commercial speech and the substantial state 
interest promoted by the advertising ban, the Commission has at least a colorable 
argument that the ban is constitutional under Central Hudson.114 
V.  PUBLIC EMPLOYER RESTRICTIONS:  WIDE LATITUDE FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
A.  Overview of Public Employer Doctrine 
Another possible avenue of defense for the Commission is to argue that it should 
be considered a public employer for purposes of analyzing the advertising ban.  In 
Pickering, the Supreme Court recognized the need to strike “a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees.”115  Under the public employer 
doctrine, when an employee’s “expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” government 
regulation “should enjoy wide latitude.”116  Moreover, even when an employee’s 
speech arguably addresses matters of public concern, the expression can still be 
regulated if it “threatens to interfere with government operations.”117 
In a recent case, Perez v. Hoblock, the court relied on the public employer 
doctrine to uphold the New York racing board’s fine of a horse owner.118  The board 
fined the owner $3,000 following his “profanity-laced verbal and physical outburst” 
at a meeting he requested with stewards for the Saratoga racetrack.119  The regulation 
under which the owner was fined permitted such a penalty for “any action 
                                                                
113This point is obviously a bone of contention in Desormeaux.  Asked about the 
Commission’s determination that advertising on jockeys’ pants could obscure the stewards’ 
view, Mr. Fiss, the Guild vice-president, responded:  “That’s reaching.  That’s probably the 
most polite way I could put it.”  Green, supra note 11 (quotations omitted).  On the contrary, 
defense attorney Miller contends “the jockey’s uncluttered white breeches make it easier for 
the stewards to determine if a rider has done something wrong.”  Id. 
114Whether the “traditions of the turf,” standing alone, would be an interest sufficient to 
justify the prohibition is more problematic.  See supra note 18. 
115391 U.S. at 568.  This balance is similar to the consideration given, when measuring 
First Amendment claims, to the need to maintain discipline and order in public schools and 
prisons.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Jones, 433 U.S. at 129. 
116Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
117Lewis v. Cohen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 823 (1999).  In 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, a government employee was terminated after circulating a 
questionnaire “concerning internal office affairs.”  The Supreme Court held the firing did not 
violate the employee’s First Amendment rights, as it was reasonable to believe the 
questionnaire “would disrupt the office, undermine [the supervisor’s] authority, and destroy 
close working relationships.”  Id. at 154. 
118248 F. Supp. 2d 189 ( S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
119Id. at 190, 191.  The owner sought the meeting to raise his concerns regarding the 
manner in which certain horses were selected to run in certain races.  Id. at 191.  When told by 
one official that his complaint was “ridiculous,” the owner began his outburst.  Id. 
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detrimental to the best interests of racing.”120  The owner filed suit challenging this 
provision on First Amendment grounds; the court found the public employer doctrine 
applicable because the owner was “a licensee in an industry closely regulated by 
defendants.”121 
Rejecting his claim, the court looked to the first Pickering factor and noted that 
the owner was fined for disrupting the meeting with the stewards, not for 
“commenting on a matter of public concern.”122  In addition, the court recognized 
that the disruption of the meeting prevented the stewards from performing their 
duties — hearing and considering the owner’s alleged grievance.123  Thus, the court 
reasoned that whatever value the owner’s speech possessed was outweighed by its 
interference with efficient government operations.124  Accordingly, the court 
concluded the owner’s “disruptive and threatening behavior need not be” protected 
by the First Amendment.125   
Similarly, in Leroy v. Illinois Racing Board, the federal Seventh Circuit rejected 
a horse owner’s First Amendment challenge to sanctions levied by the state racing 
board.126  As in Perez, the owner was fined for making threats and using profanity, in 
violation of a regulation which prohibited “improper language” or “improper 
conduct” towards members of the board.127  In response to the owner’s argument that 
the regulation was vague and overbroad, the court conceded that “addressed to the 
general public for the conduct of daily affairs, [the rule] would be seriously 
deficient.”128  Addressed solely to licensees, however, and governing only their 
relations with the board, the court considered the regulatory scheme to have “much 
in common with civil service laws, which despite their many vague terms were 
sustained” by the Supreme Court.129  The court therefore held the regulation did not 
violate the First Amendment.130 
                                                                
120Id. at 192; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. title 9, § 4022.13. 
121Id. at 192-93, 195. 
122Perez, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
123Id.  
124Id. 
125Id. at 195 (quotations omitted); see Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“The government can prevail if it can show that it reasonably believed that the speech would 
potentially interfere with or disrupt the government’s activities, and can persuade the court 
that the potential disruptiveness was sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment value of that 
speech”) (citations omitted). 
12639 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131 (1995).  The Perez court 
cited Leroy in support of its decision.  248 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
127Leroy, 39 F.3d at 715. 
128Id. 
129Id.; see Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607-15; CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 568-81 
(1973). 
130Leroy, 39 F.3d at 715. 
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B.  Public Employer Analysis of Desormeaux  
The Desormeaux plaintiffs are licensees in the same regulated industry as the 
owners in Perez and Leroy.131  Thus, the Commission may attempt to argue that 
under the public employer doctrine the jockey advertising ban is proper.132  Key to 
such an argument would be:  (1) showing that advertising worn by jockeys would not 
constitute “comment on a public matter,” or, perhaps more likely, (2) that the 
advertising would interfere with the stewards in the performance of their duties.133 
On the first factor, it is worth noting that in Perez and Leroy the owners were 
fined for profanity and making threats, forms of speech that have little to no First 
Amendment value.134  Conversely, advertising is protected by the First Amendment, 
although not to the same extent as “pure” or “political” speech.135  Given the lesser 
value placed on commercial speech, it is not clear whether jockey advertising would 
be considered as relating to any matter of “social” or “other concern to the 
community.”136  If not, then the advertising ban could be upheld under the public 
employer doctrine.137 
Assuming arguendo that jockey advertising would be considered “comment on a 
public matter,” the analysis then entails whether such communications would 
interfere with government operations — i.e., the stewards’ duties in officiating the 
races.138  As noted, the Commission determined that even the Guild patch could 
distract the stewards from performing their duties.139  If this determination is 
reasonable, then the advertising ban could again be upheld under the public employer 
doctrine.140 
VI.  PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
A.  Overview of Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
Finally, the Commission may argue that the advertising ban is a valid restriction 
of speech in a non-public forum.  Because the First Amendment is not absolute, even 
                                                                
131See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009. 
132See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text. 
133See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
134See supra notes 119 & 127 and accompanying text. 
135See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
136Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.  Obviously, the content of the advertising would be critical in 
making this determination.  And again, this assumes that certain communications  are either 
commercial speech or something else, for example, political speech.  See Nike, 45 P.3d at 268 
(Brown, J., dissenting); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.  In reality, commercial 
speech can be blended with other, more protected forms of expression, although the 
jurisprudence has not yet recognized this fact.  Nike, 45 P.3d at 268-69 (Brown, J., dissenting).   
137Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
138See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
139See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
140See Perez, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
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in a public forum the government may impose “reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.’”141  In contrast, in a non-public 
forum, a lesser standard applies:  the government may prohibit all forms of 
communication, provided the ban is reasonable and content-neutral.142  
The public forum determination is based on “how the locale is used.  Streets, 
parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public forum because they have 
traditionally served as a place for free assembly and communication by citizens.”143  
Likewise, “municipal theaters and auditoriums are designed for and dedicated to 
expressive activities” and therefore are considered public forums.144 
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports 
and Exposition Authority, the federal Third Circuit affirmed an order denying a 
religious society the right to distribute literature and solicit funds at the 
Meadowlands Sports Complex, which includes a football stadium and racetrack.145  
In so holding, the court concluded that the Meadowlands, despite being a public 
place, was not a public forum.146  On the contrary, according to the court, the 
Meadowlands did not fit any of the traditional definitions of a public forum, but 
instead was a “commercial venture” aimed at “earn[ing] money by attracting and 
entertaining spectators with athletic events and horse races.”147 
Because the Meadowlands was not a public forum, the court looked only to 
whether the solicitation ban was reasonable.148  This, in turn, was determined by 
whether the “proposed activity is basically incompatible with the normal character 
and function of the place.”149  Concluding that the proposed solicitation would 
“disrupt the normal activities of the [Meadowlands],” the court held the ban 
reasonable, and denied the First Amendment challenge.150 
                                                                
141Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted).  In Ward, 
the Supreme Court upheld noise control measures for a public bandshell, concluding that the 
regulation was content-neutral and a narrowly tailored restriction on the time, place, and 
manner of protected speech.  Id. at 791, 803. 
142United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 
n.7 (1981). 
143International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports and 
Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939)). 
144Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)). 
145Id. at 158.  With the sole exception of concessionaires, no one was permitted to solicit 
funds or distribute literature at the Meadowlands.  Id.   
146Id. at 159 (“Not all public places are public forums.”). 
147Id. at 161. 
148International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 691 F.2d at 161. 
149Id. (citations omitted). 
150Id. 
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B.  Public Forum Analysis of Desormeaux  
Given the above, the Commission could argue that Churchill Downs is, like the 
Meadowlands, a non-public forum.151  That is, it could be argued that the purpose of 
Churchill Downs, and more specifically the track itself, is to be a place where horse 
races are run, not where messages are expressed.  The question then would be the 
reasonableness of the jockey advertising ban.152  The Commission’s determination 
that the Guild patch could interfere with the stewards’ duties would, if reasonable, 
satisfy this burden.153  In addition, whether advertising is “basically incompatible 
with the normal character and function of” the track could implicate the “traditions 
of the turf,” which the Commission has determined do not include commercial 
messages worn by jockeys.154  Thus, the advertising ban could be upheld as a 
reasonable restriction of speech in a non-public forum.155 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Desormeaux plaintiffs present a compelling “as applied” challenge to the 
jockey advertising ban in that they have been fined for essentially “pure speech,” i.e., 
wearing union patches.  On the issue of overbreadth, however, the Commission has 
good arguments in support of the prohibition, particularly given the lesser value 
accorded commercial speech and the other theories under which the ban could be 
upheld.  Whatever the ultimate outcome, Desormeaux has the potential to make 
significant First Amendment law, as well as impact the future of the horse racing 
industry. 
                                                                
151Unlike the Meadowlands, Churchill Downs is privately owned.  See 
www.churchilldowns.com.  The Supreme Court, however, has applied the public forum 
analysis even to “conduct occurring on private property.”  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).  Thus, the 
track’s purpose should govern its public forum status, not whether it is public or private 
property.  
152Id. 
153Id.; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
154See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
155See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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